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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Was the district court correct in dismissing the City of
Northwood's request for an order compelling the United
States Department of the Interior to perform a natural
resource damage assessment and to recover damages from
the Multi-Chem Chemical Company under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act?
II. Was the district court correct in granting Multi-Chem's
motion to dismiss the City of Northwood's CERCLA ac-
tion, where the City of Northwood is clearly excluded
from maintaining such an action by the plain language
and the overall purpose of the statute?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, City of Northwood, (the City), brought suit in
the United States District Court for the District of New
Union against both the United States Department of the Inte-
rior and Multi-Chem Chemical Company (Multi-Chem). The
City initiated this suit in response to Multi-Chem's alleged
"hazardous substance" contamination of the groundwater and
surface waters of the Northwood National Wildlife Refuge.
The City's lawsuit consists of two causes of action for nat-
ural resources damage under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) §§
101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1983). The first cause of ac-
tion would force the Secretary of the Interior to perform a
natural resource damage assessment of the Refuge and then
recover damages from Multi-Chem in the Secretary's capacity
as a designated "natural resources trustee." The City's second
cause of action lays claim to an independent authority to
bring action on its own behalf as a trustee of natural
resources.
Appellees, Multi-Chem and the Department of the Inte-
rior, filed motions to dismiss the City's first cause of action.
These motions were naturally opposed by the City. Multi-
Chem also filed a motion to dismiss the City's second cause of
action. This motion was opposed by both the City and the
Interior Department. The district court granted all motions to
dismiss.
Appellant, City of Northwood, is an affluent suburb of
New Union City, the capital of the State of New Union. (R.1).
Settled in the early 1700's, it was a busy industrial city of fac-
tory workers and machinists until the Second World War.
(R.1). However, most of the industrial companies have since
relocated, in search of lower labor costs. (R.1). While the
City's economy was depressed for a time, it has taken a signif-
icant upsurge in recent years. No longer a bleak municipality
of high unemployment, pockmarked by abandoned industrial
and factory sites, the City is today an increasingly affluent
"bedroom community." (R.1) It attracts doctors, lawyers, en-
gineers, and other professionals who commute to work in New
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Union City. (R.1).
Appellee Multi-Chem Chemical Company's historical ties
to the City of Northwood are quite unlike those of the major-
ity of industrial companies once located there. Multi-Chem
moved into the City as most other industries began to aban-
don it. In 1943, Multi-Chem built a small pesticide processing
plant within Northwood to produce insecticides for American
G.I.s fighting in the Pacific. (R.2). This plant continued to op-
erate after the war, producing agricultural pesticides. (R.2).
Multi-Chem's Northwood facility was never large. Before it
closed in 1985; the plant employed 35 people. (R.2).
Multi-Chem has gained a reputation as one of the most
progressive employers in the State of New Union, where it
employs close to 16,000 persons. (R.2). Its generosity is well-
known, as both an employer and a corporate citizen. Not only
does Multi-Chem maintain an aggressive affirmative action
plan and generous employee benefit plan for child care and
elder care, but it also provides large donations to local hospi-
tals and schools, and funding for a homeless shelter in New
Union City. (R.2).
Multi-Chem's Northwood plant was located just outside
the boundary of the Northwood National Wildlife Refuge.
(R.2). This Refuge is owned and administered by the Appel-
lee, United States Department of the Interior. (R.1) The Ref-
uge is situated entirely within the City of Northwood's munic-
ipal boundaries. (R.2). The City's municipal ordinances apply
within the Refuge to the same extent as elsewhere in the City.
(R.2). The City provides the Refuge with such services as fire
protection and trash removal. (R.2).
Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that the Refuge is
located within the heavily developed metropolitan area of
New Union City, it remains an important stopover for certain
migratory species of birds. (R.1). The Refuge lies along an im-
portant flyway for several species of ducks, geese, and other
waterfowl. (R.1). Many thousands of these birds use the Ref-
uge as an overnight stopping area during their biannual mi-
gration between Canada and the southern latitudes. (R.1). In-
terior Department biologists have concluded that the bird
population would stop significantly if the Refuge were re-
1990]
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placed by development. (R.1).
The Refuge is also an important aesthetic and recrea-
tional resource. (R.2). It is one of Northwood's principal at-
tractions and undoubtedly one of the reasons for the City's
newfound popularity among "affluent commuters" as a place
to live. (R.1). The Refuge provides a place for the public to
bike, to hike, and to watch birds. (R.2). It also serves as a
visual and noise buffer for the City from the highway. (R.2).
In 1984, the City Health Department tested the drinking
water wells for homes located downgradient, (i.e. downstream
in the aquifer), from Multi-Chem's Northwood plant. (R.2).
This shallow aquifer is thought to flow in a direction from
Multi-Chem's plant, beneath the tested homes, and onward
toward the Refuge. (R.2). The wetlands and marshes within
the Refuge are conjectured to be hydrologically connected to
this aquifer. (R.2). These wetlands and marshes are not sub-
ject to the ebb and flow of the tides and have never been navi-
gable. (R.2).
The City Health Department's well tests revealed several
chemicals in the water which meet the test for "hazardous
substances" under Federal law. (R.2). These chemicals happen
to be ingredients for the pesticides manufactured at the
Multi-Chem pesticide plant. (R.2). The City also found levels
of the pesticides present in the surface waters of the Ref-
uge.(R.2). However, all parties agree that more complete sam-
pling, done over several seasons of the year, is necessary to
determine the full extent to which the pesticide contamina-
tion has entered the Refuge's surface waters. (R.2-3).
The City's municipal water supply has not been affected
by any level of groundwater contamination. (R.3). In 1987,
three years after the initial testing revealed the presence of
"hazardous substances" in the water, the City ordered the
contaminated wells closed. (R.3). It connected the affected
homes to the pure municipal water supply at a cost of
$230,000. (R.3). Multi-Chem agreed to reimburse the City for
these costs without any admission of liability, and without the
City's agreeing to waive any potential claims by the City
against Multi-Chem. (R.3).
The City of Northwood is still concerned about the pesti-
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cide ingredients which have apparently continued to flow into
the marshes and wetlands of the Refuge. (R.3). The City be-
lieves that this may pose a potential threat to the migratory
birds who use the Refuge as a brief overnight resting and
feeding stop. (R.1,3). The three parties involved: the City, the
Interior Department, and Multi-Chem, have failed to resolve
the issue after extended correspondence. (R.3). As a result,
the City of Northwood brought this lawsuit in 1989.
The Department of the Interior indicated to the district
court that although it would be willing to perform a natural
resource damage assessment, it does not currently have the
funds available to do so. (R.4). The Department stated that it
may in fact perform this assessment in the future but, due to
budgetary constraints, not until 1992 at the earliest. Accord-
ing to the Department's five-year budget plan, funding will
not be available before this date. (R.4).
The estimated cost of a natural resource damage assess-
ment for the Refuge is $1.1 million. (R.4). Congress appropri-
ated $100 million to the Interior Department for the general
operation of the entire National Wildlife Refuge System.
(R.4). The Department concedes that it could legally spend
some of this money for the natural resource damage assess-
ment if it chose to do so. (R.4). However, the Department has
concluded this money is already overcommitted for such basic
needs as the general upkeep of the various refuges, the sala-
ries of refuge employees, and long-planned repairs and im-
provements for refuge buildings throughout the national ref-
uge system. (R.4). The Secretary of the Interior has decided,
as a matter of administrative policy, that these needs are a
higher priority than funding the natural resources damage as-
sessment of the Northwood Refuge. (R.4).
In pre-litigation correspondence, the City asked the Inte-
rior Department to request extra funds to pay for the damage
assessment as a line-item in its next budget submission to
Congress. (R.4). The Department refused to do so. It asserted
that the President's Office of Management and Budget and
the relevant Congressional committees would probably deny
such a line-item request. Even if they were to approve it, the
Department believes that they would simply transfer the
1990]
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money out of the requested general appropriation in order to
maintain the overall appropriation available to the Interior
Department. (R.4-5).
The Mayor of Northwood also requested that the Gover-
nor of New Union designate her as a trustee for natural re-
sources in Northwood, but the Governor declined to do so.
(R.5-6). The district court noted the officials designated by
the Governor to serve as state trustees are all heads of such
state departments as the Department of Natural Resources
and the Department of Environmental Protection. (R.5). The
designated state trustees have claimed that like the federal
Interior Department, they lack sufficient funds to conduct a
natural resource damage assessment of the Northwood Ref-
uge. (R.6).
The District Court for the District of New Union granted
Appellees' motions to dismiss the City of Northwood's first
cause of action because the court lacked subject matter juris-
diction under CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659. (R.5). The
court held that the decision of whether and when to perform a
natural resource damage assessment is a discretionary en-
forcement decision of the administrative agency in its role as
trustee of natural resources. (R.5). In addition, the court held
that the terms "trustee" and "trusteeship" as used within
CERCLA § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f), are not meant to in-
voke the public trust doctrine. The basis of the holding is that
the doctrine is too narrowly drawn for application to the fac-
tual circumstances of this case. (R.5).
The district court also granted Appellee Multi-Chem's
motion to dismiss the City's second cause of action under
CERCLA. The court held that the City is not a state, and its
officials are not state officials within the meaning of CERCLA
§ 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f). (R.5). The matter is before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit on
appeal.
The City of Northwood's appeal raises two questions
before this court. First, whether the United States District
Court for the District of New Union was correct in dismissing
the City's request for an order compelling the Interior Depart-
ment to perform a natural resource damage assessment and to
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recover damages from Multi-Chem under CERCLA. Second,
whether the district court was correct in granting Multi-
Chem's motion to dismiss the City's independent CERCLA
action on the grounds that the City is clearly excluded from
maintaining such an action by the plain language and purpose
of the statute.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant, City of Northwood, does not have the author-
ity to compel the United States Department of the Interior, as
trustee, to either perform a natural resource damage assess-
ment or to recover for damages to natural resources under
CERCLA. CERCLA does permit "persons" to commence a
civil action against a natural resource trustee for failure to un-
dertake a non-discretionary duty. However, because the deci-
sions to perform a natural resource damage assessment or re-
cover damages are discretionary, the Department of Interior
cannot be compelled to perform either of these actions.
Congress did not authorize the promulgation of regula-
tions which would make the performance of a damage assess-
ment a non-discretionary duty of the trustee. Furthermore,
the regulations which were eventually promulgated expressly
state that the duty to perform a natural resource damage as-
sessment is discretionary. Therefore, because the duty is dis-
cretionary, an action to compel its performance cannot be sus-
tained under CERCLA's citizen suit provision.
The district court properly held that actions to recover
for damages to natural resources are basically enforcement
proceedings. The fact that it is an enforcement means that
the decision of whether to commence such an action is inher-
ently vested in the agency entrusted with the statute's en-
forcement. Such discretion is necessary because of the multi-
ple factors that go into the decision of whether to proceed.
Congress recognized that the respective agencies are in the
best situation to balance these factors. Therefore, an action to
compel the Department of the Interior to recover for damages
to the natural resources cannot be sustained because it is an
enforcement action committed to agency discretion.
1990]
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Appellant argues that the words "trustee" and "trustee-
ship" employed by Congress within CERCLA § 107(f) are
meant to invoke the public trust doctrine. Therefore, Appel-
lant contends, the public trust doctrine should act as overrid-
ing authority to compel the Interior Department to perform a
natural resource damage assessment and to recover damages
from Multi-Chem. However, such an invocation would require
an unwarranted expansion of the scope of this ancient com-
mon law doctrine and run contrary to a significant body of
precedent established by the United States Supreme Court. It
would also run contrary to Congress' intention that the deci-
sion to perform a natural resource damage assessment pursu-
ant to CERCLA § 107(f)(1) is a discretionary duty vested in
the statutorily designated trustee.
The origins of the public trust doctrine in the United
States are rooted in the common law traditions of England.
There, the land beneath navigable, tidal waters was impressed
with the public trust and held by the Crown for the common
use and benefit of the nation. In the United States, the Su-
preme Court has held that navigable fresh-waters and all tidal
waters and the lands beneath them are similarly impressed
with such a trust. Ownership of these lands and waters vested
in the states upon entry into the Union as part of their sover-
eign capacity to hold them subject to the public trust. The
marshes and wetlands of the Northwood National Wildlife
Refuge are not tidal and have never been navigable. They
therefore fall beyond the scope of the public trust doctrine.
Additionally, since the decision of whether to pursue an
enforcement action is discretionary under CERCLA § 107(f),
Congress could not have meant for the terms "trustee" and
"trusteeship" to invoke the public trust doctrine. The doc-
trine would require an affirmative obligation on the part of
the trustee where none was intended.
Appellant maintains that where the federal government,
in the exercise of its discretionary power, elects not to per-
form a damage assessment of, or recover damages to, a natural
resource for which it is a trustee, that a municipality may
bring such an action as a state under CERCLA § 107(f)(1).
This contention is contrary to the plain language of the stat-
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ute, which makes specific provisions for local government and
includes such entities under its definition of "person."
Appellant also cannot be considered an authorized repre-
sentative of a state and therefore, may not bring an action as
a trustee for the Refuge. Such trustees are to be appointed by
the Governor, and the Governor of New Union has declined to
designate the City of Northwood as trustee for the Refuge.
Those trustees that have been appointed have also elected not
to support this action.
Not only is such an action precluded by the plain lan-
guage of the statute, it is also contrary to its overall purpose.
The statute calls for prioritization and the exercise of discre-
tion by the states in deciding when and where to bring en-
forcement actions.
When the expansive definition of "State" suggested by
Appellant is applied consistently throughout the statute, it
becomes evidence that such a reading of the statute is not
what Congress intended. The only definition that can be ap-
plied in a consistent fashion throughout the statute without
defeating the intent of Congress is the narrow one that arises
from the plain language of the statute.
For all the above reasons, the judgment of the District
Court of New Union should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I. A MUNICIPALITY DOES NOT HAVE THE STATU-
TORY AUTHORITY TO COMPEL THE .UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, AS
TRUSTEE, TO PERFORM A NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RECOVER FOR DAM-
AGES PURSUANT TO SECTION 107(f)(1) OF CER-
CLA, AND THEREFORE, AN ACTION TO COMPEL
SUCH AN ASSESSMENT IS NOT SUSTAINABLE.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act, (CERCLA), was enacted in December
1980. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1983 & Supp. V 1989). In gen-
eral, CERCLA provides the federal government with author-
ity to either: compel responsible parties to conduct cleanup of
1990]
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hazardous waste sites, or to initiate cleanup actions and then
determine who is liable for appropriate cost recovery. Id. Con-
gress gave new life to CERCLA by extending, and to some
extent amending, the statute's authority in 1986. The
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA) was a five-year extension of the CERCLA program.
Id. Unless otherwise specified, references to CERCLA in this
brief refer to the statute as amended.
CERCLA allows any person to commence a civil action
against a natural resources trustee for failure to undertake a
non-discretionary duty mandated by CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §
9659(a)(2). Specifically, the statute provides:
Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this sec-
tion and in section 9613(h) of this title, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf against the
President or any other officer of the United States ...
where there is alleged a failure of the President or of such
other officer to perform any act or duty under this chap-
ter . . . which is not discretionary with the President or
such other officer.
Id. (emphasis added).
Similar provisions permitting increased citizen involve-
ment can be found in many of the significant federal environ-
mental statutes.1 Appellant invoked this provision in order to
compel the United States Department of the Interior, as trus-
tee, to perform a natural resource damage assessment and to
recover damages from the Appellee, Multi-Chem Chemical
Company. (R.3).
Proper application of this citizen suit provision demands
that two threshold criteria be met. First, the City of
Northwood must qualify as a "person" under the relevant
portion of the statute. Second, the duty sought to be com-
pelled must be non-discretionary in nature. The Appellee con-
1. See also Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA) § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (1988); Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 300(j-8) (1988).
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cedes that the City of Northwood has met the first criterion.
Under CERCLA, the term "person" means, "an individual,
firm, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, com-
mercial entity, United States Government, State, municipal-
ity, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any inter-
state body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (emphasis added).
Therefore, for purposes of commencing an action under sec-
tion 310(a)(2) of CERCLA to compel the performance of a
non-discretionary duty, the City of Northwood is a "person."
The second criterion requires an evaluation of the duty
which the City seeks to compel under the citizen suit provi-
sion of CERCLA. The statute provides that only those duties
which are non-discretionary may be compelled pursuant to
this provision. Conversely, if a duty is solely within the discre-
tion of the trustee, then its performance cannot be compelled.
A. The Decision to Perform a Natural Resource Dam-
age Assessment Pursuant to Section 107(f)(1) of
CERCLA is a Discretionary Duty Vested in the
Trustee.
It is well established that the starting point for interpret-
ing a statute is the language of the statute itself. Consumer
Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102
(1980). In determining the scope of a statute, a court should
look first to the statute's language. If that language is unam-
biguous and there is an absence of clearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary, the language must ordinarily be re-
garded as conclusive. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576
(1981). The CERCLA citizen suit provision, on its face, clearly
prohibits any person from commencing an action to compel a
natural resource trustee to perform a discretionary duty.
The duties of a trustee are codified in an interdependent
statutory and regulatory framework which is common to many
of the complex federal environmental statutes. Proper evalua-
tion of the trustee's duties under CERCLA requires that each
provision which could give rise to a duty, discretionary or
non-discretionary, to perform a natural resource damage as-
sessment be examined. The provisions which serve to deline-
1990]
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ate the trustee's duties are: (1) CERCLA section 301(c)(1)
which confers authority to conduct natural resource damage
assessments; (2) CERCLA section 107(f)(1) which authorizes
the appointment of natural resource trustees; and (3) the reg-
ulations promulgated by the agencies to effectuate these two
statutory provisions. Each of these statutory provisions will be
examined individually in order to more clearly establish that
the decision to perform a natural resource damage assessment
is entirely discretionary. As a result, the City of Northwood is
without authority to compel the Department of the Interior to
conduct such an assessment.
The statutory mechanisms which authorize natural re-
source damage assessments do not provide that the perform-
ance of such assessments is mandatory. For our purposes, the
natural resource damage provisions of CERCLA can be bro-
ken down into two distinct "sections: (1) section 301(c) which
requires the promulgation of regulations for the assessment of
natural resource damages; and (2) section 107(a) which is the
liability section of CERCLA. The liability section identifies
those parties which may be held liable, the scope of their lia-
bility, and~the general defenses which they may claim under
the statute. A proper examination of the duties which these,
sections place on natural resource trustees requires that we
examine each individually, recognizing, however, that each is
mutually dependent.
The provision of CERCLA which mandates the promul-
gation of regulations for the assessment of natural resource
damages does not provide that the performance of such as-
sessments shall be mandatory. The section provides, in perti-
nent part, that:
[t]he President, acting through Federal officials desig-
nated by the National Contingency Plan . . . shall study
and, . . . shall promulgate regulations for the assessment
of damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources resulting from a release of oil or a hazardous
substance for purposes of this Act.
42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1) (1983 & Supp. V 1989).
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The plain language of this provision does not confer upon
the President the authority to promulgate regulations that
make the performance of such assessments a non-discretion-
ary duty. Therefore, even if the regulations adopted pursuant
to this provision did make the assessment process mandatory,
such a regulation would be improper because Congress did not
authorize the President to exercise such legislative power. Ap-
pellee, Multi-Chem, does not concede that the regulations
provided any indication that the decision to perform a dam-
age assessment is non-discretionary. Quite to the contrary, the
regulations adopted pursuant to CERCLA which provide for
the assessment of damages expressly state that the assessment
procedures are not mandatory.
The regulations adopted pursuant to CERCLA for the as-
sessment of damages were published in final form in August
1986. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.10-11.93 (1987). Soon after the issuance
of these regulations, Congress amended CERCLA by enacting
SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). In response,
the Department of the Interior revised the regulations. 53
Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988). Despite the revision, the regulations
have consistently read that the natural resource damage as-
sessment provides:
[A] procedure by which a natural resource trustee can de-
termine compensation for injuries to natural resources
that have not been nor are expected to be addressed by
response actions conducted pursuant to the NCP. The as-
sessment procedures set forth in this part are not
mandatory. However, they must be used by Federal or
State natural resource trustees in order to obtain the re-
buttable presumption contained in section 9607(f)(2)(C)
of CERCLA.
43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (emphasis added).
The plain language of this regulation dictates that the as-
sessment procedures are mandatory only to the extent that
the natural resource trustee wishes to obtain a rebuttable pre-
sumption at a subsequent trial or administrative hearing. The
regulation, by expressly stating that the procedures are not
mandatory, unequivocally leaves the decision of whether to
1990]
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conduct an assessment to the discretion of the natural re-
source trustee. The Appellee would hasten to point out that
this is entirely consistent with the statutory provision, dis-
cussed above, which authorized the promulgation of these
regulations.
In sum, Congress did not authorize the promulgation of
regulations which make the performance of a damage assess-
ment a non-discretionary duty of the trustee. Further, the reg-
ulations which were eventually adopted to effectuate the stat-
utory requirements expressly state that the duty is not
mandatory. The conclusion follows, that the duty to perform a
natural resource damage assessment is discretionary. There-
fore, because the duty is discretionary, an action to compel its
performance cannot be sustained under CERCLA's citizen
suit provision.
The second statutory provision which Appellants may ar-
gue gives rise to a duty to perform a natural resource damage
assessment is CERCLA section 107(f)(1). This section autho-
rizes the appointment of natural resource trustees. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(1). Specifically, the statute provides that the Presi-
dent "shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natu-
ral resources to recover damages." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Re-
covery includes "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss
of natural resources, including the reasonable cost of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release."
Id. at § 9607(a)(4)(C). For National Wildlife Refuges, the
President has delegated this authority to the Department of
the Interior. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 40 C.F.R. § 300.75 (1987)
- U.S.C.. Appellee concedes the fact that the Department
of the Interior has a duty to act as a trustee. However, the
duty to serve as trustee does not give rise to a mandatory duty
to perform natural resources damage assessments.
The plain language of the regulations adopted to deline-
ate the responsibilities of federal natural resource trustees add
further credence to the Appellee Multi-Chem's contention
that the duty to perform a damage assessment is discretion-
ary. The regulation provides:
[t]he Federal trustees for natural resources shall be re-
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sponsible for assessing damages to the resource in accor-
dance with regulations promulgated under section 301 of
CERCLA, seeking recovery for the costs of assessment
and for the losses from the person responsible or from the
Fund, and devising and carrying out a plan for restora-
tion, rehabilitation, or replacement or acquisition, of
equivalent natural resources pursuant to CERCLA.
40 C.F.R. § 300.73 (1988). This statutory provision explicitly
provides that the trustee shall have the responsibility for as-
sessing damages to natural resources. This merely implies that
the assessment is one tool in the trustee's arsenal against pol-
lution under CERCLA. Further, the statute explicitly states
that the assessment must be done "in accordance with the
regulations promulgated under section 301 of CERCLA." 42
U.S.C. § 9651. As noted above, the regulations promulgated
pursuant to section 301 of CERCLA expressly provide that
natural resource damage assessments "are not mandatory." 43
C.F.R. § 11.10.
To find further support for the conclusion that the dam-
age assessment is a discretionary duty of the trustee one may
also look to the "Section-by-Section" comments which accom-
panied the promulgation of the final regulations by the De-
partment of the Interior. 53 Fed. Reg. 5170 (1988). There, the
Department had the opportunity to respond to comments
which interpreted the language of the regulation prescribing
that the federal trustees "shall assess damages for injury to
.... " The comments received by the Department of the In-
terior expressed an understanding that this language makes
the assessment of natural resource damage by trustees a non-
discretionary duty. Id. The Department of Interior responded
that "the natural resource damage assessment rule is optional
and applies only in those instances where a trustee chooses to
use the process . . . to obtain a rebuttable presumption." Id.
It may be argued that the Department of Interior's inter-
pretive statements are self-serving and therefore, should not
be relied upon in determining the outcome of this suit. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "the
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressio-
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nally-created . . . program necessarily requires the formula-
tion of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, im-
plicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). Fur-
ther, the Chevron Court noted that, "[s]uch legislative regula-
tions are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. The De-
partment of the Interior's regulations are neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor manifestly contrary to the statute. Therefore,
these regulations should be accorded controlling weight in the
disposition of this matter.
In conclusion, the decision to perform a natural resource
damage assessment pursuant to section 107(f)(1) is within the
sole discretion of the natural resource trustee. As such, the
trustee cannot be compelled to conduct such an assessment
under the citizen suit provision of CERCLA which limits the
ability of a person to compel performance of non-discretion-
ary duties by a trustee.
B. The Decision of the United States Department of
the Interior Whether to Proceed with an Enforce-
ment Action is Discretionary.
The City of Northwood petitioned the district court, inter
alia, for an order to the Department of the Interior to recover
damages from Multi-Chem Chemical Company. (R.1). The
district court subsequently dismissed the City's request. (R.3).
The district court characterized the recovery of damages as an
enforcement action and, therefore, discretionary in nature.
(R.5). Appellee, Multi-Chem, agrees that the recovery of dam-
ages is properly characterized as an enforcement action within
the meaning of CERCLA. Therefore, because it is an enforce-
ment action, the decision as to whether to pursue such action
is inherently within the agency's sole discretion. As a result,
an action under CERCLA's citizen suit provision to compel
performance of such a duty cannot be sustained.
As noted earlier, CERCLA provides that the "President
shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural re-
[15]
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sources to recover . . .damages." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Fur-
ther, CERCLA provides that "the President shall designate in
the National Contingency Plan the federal officials who shall
act on behalf of the public as trustees." Id. at § 9607(f)(2)(A).
Regulations were subsequently adopted, and amended, by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reflect and to ef-
fectuate the responsibilities and powers created by CERCLA.
40 C.F.R. §§ 300.72-300.74 (1985). The EPA noted that it was
prompted, in part, to make the latest changes to the regula-
tions concerning natural resource trustees because of a con-
cern for clarification of the roles and responsibilities of these
parties. 50 Fed. Reg. 47,917 (1985). The regulations provide
quite simply that:
[t]he trustee may, upon notification, take the following
actions as appropriate:
(3) Initiate actions against responsible parties under
CERCLA section 107(a); or
(4) Pursue a claim against the Fund for injury, destruc-
tion, or loss of a natural resource, as authorized by CER-
CLA section 111. (When this option is selected a plan for
restoration, rehabilitation, or replacement or acquisition
of equivalent natural resources must be adopted pursuant
to section 111(i) of CERCLA.)
40 C.F.R. § 300.74(b)(1)-(4) (emphasis added). The plain lan-
guage of this regulation dictates the conferral of discretionary
power to the trustee, with which the trustee is to fashion re-
sponses to alleged violations. As the Chevron Court noted,
such regulations "are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The Appellants have not challenged
the regulations as adopted by the Department of Interior.
Therefore, the plain language of the regulation, which confers
discretionary power upon the trustee to seek damage recovery,
should be accorded controlling weight by this court.
Regulatory discretion is attributable in no small part to
the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency deci-
[16]
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sions to refuse enforcement. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
831 (1985). The Chaney Court justified the existence of dis-
cretion in enforcement actions by explaining that an agency
decision to commence an enforcement action necessarily in-
volves a "complicated balancing of a number of factors" which
are peculiarly within the expertise of the given agency. Id.
Thus, the Court noted:
the agency must not only assess whether a violation has
occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on
this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to
succeed if its acts, whether the particular enforcement ac-
tion requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and,
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to un-
dertake the action at all.
Id. The Court recognized that an agency is much better
equipped than the courts to balance the almost endless num-
ber of variables involved in determining whether to pursue an
enforcement action. Id. at 832.
The citizen suit provision of CERCLA, under which the
Appellants initiated this action, provides that any "person
may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . where
there is alleged a failure of such other officer to perform any
act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary." 42
U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2)(emphasis added). It is evident that the de-
cision of whether to pursue an enforcement action is, and
must continue to be, discretionary. As a result, the City of
Northwood has no basis on which to sustain an action to com-
pel the United States Department of the Interior to pursue
this enforcement action. Therefore, the district court properly
dismissed the City's motion to compel such action.
C. The Statutory Language of CERCLA Section 107(f)
Does Not Invoke the Public Trust Doctrine as Au-
thority to Compel the United States Department of
the Interior to Perform a Natural Resource Damage
Assessment.
Appellant contends that the statutory uses of the terms
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"trustee" and "trusteeship" within CERCLA section 107(f)
are meant to invoke the seemingly omnipotent yet amorphous
public trust doctrine. (R.5). The use of the term "invoke" is
quite appropriate in this instance. The definition of "invoke"
includes "to call on (God, a saint, the Muses, etc.), for bless-
ing, help, inspiration, protection, etc.," "to summon (evil spir-
its) by incantation; to conjure," and "to ask solemnly for; to
beg for; to implore; entreat." Webster's Deluxe Unabridged
Dictionary 967 (2d ed. 1979).
The Appellant would ask this court to look beyond the
statutorily delineated discretionary duty vested in the trustee
for authority to compel the Interior Department to perform a
natural resource damage assessment. This authority would ap-
parently come from the Department's affirmative duty to
honor its obligations with regard to land impressed with a
trust for the public's benefit. The Appellees will show that the
district court was correct in holding that the public trust doc-
trine is too narrow to be implicated in the expansive, sweeping
manner Appellants request in the case before the bar.
Appellees acknowledge that the terms "trustee" and
"trusteeship" are used freely in the language of CERCLA sec-
tion 107(f). For example:
The President, or the authorized representative of any
State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such
natural resources to recover such damages. Sums recov-
ered ... as trustee . . . shall be retained by the trustee
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (f)(1) (emphasis added).
Such officials shall assess damages for injury to ... natu-
ral resources under their trusteeship and may ... assess
damages for those natural resources under the State's
trusteeship.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
The public trust doctrine is simple to state: The sovereign
may dispose of its proprietary rights in trust lands, the "jus
privatum," but its obligation to manage trust lands in the
1990]
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public interest, the "jus publicum," is inalienable. An under-
standing of the public trust doctrine depends on an analysis
of the transfer of power or sovereignty. Prior to the American
Revolution, navigable waters were under control of the King.
The seminal case in this country, Martin v. The Lessee of
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), construed a royal pat-
ent of the present states of New York and New Jersey as pass-
ing the incidents of sovereignty as well as title to the lands
conveyed by Charles II. Thus:
[T]he land under the navigable waters passed to the
grantee as one of the royalties incident to the powers of
government and were to be held by him in the same man-
ner and for the same purposes that the navigable waters
of England, and the soils under them, are held by the
crown.
Martin, 41 U.S. at 413-14 (emphasis added). The character of
the public trust apparently changed upon Independence, for
while the power of the King to make an exclusive grant of the
soil underlying navigable waters were questionable, the Mar-
tin Court said that:
[W]hen the Revolution took place the people of each
State became themselves sovereign; and in that character
hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and
the soils under them for their own common use, subject
only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution
of the general government.
Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
In 1845, the Supreme Court held that upon admission of
the state of Alabama into the Union, the title in the lands
below highwater mark of the navigable waters passed to the
state and could not afterwards be granted away by the Con-
gress. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223
(1845). This concept, the equal footing doctrine, is succinctly
stated by the Court:
The right of Alabama and every other new State to exer-
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cise all the powers of government, which belong to and
may be exercised by the original States of the Union,
must be admitted, and remain unquestioned, except so
far as they are, temporarily, deprived of control over the
public lands.
Id. at 224. In the most recent case before the Supreme Court
dealing with the public trust doctrine, the Court "reaffirm[ed]
our long-standing precedents which hold that the States, upon
entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands under
waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide." Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988) (emphasis
added). This line of precedent began in Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1 (1894). There the Court examined its prior cases,
the English common law, and various state court cases, and
concluded:
At common law, the title and dominion in lands flowed by
the tide were in the King for the benefit of the nation.
Upon the settlement of the Colonies, like rights passed to
the grantee in the royal charters, in trust for the commu-
nities to be established. Upon the American Revolution,
these rights, charged with a like trust, were vested in the
original States within their respective borders, subject to
the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United
States.
Id. at 57.
The Court criticized the "ebb and flow" measure of admi-
ralty jurisdiction inherited from England in The Propeller
Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 456-57 (1852). The
Court insisted that the different topography of America-in
particular our "thousands of miles of public navigable
water[s] . . . in which there is no tide"-required that "juris-
diction [be] made to depend upon the navigable character of
the water, and not upon the ebb and flow of the tide." Id. at
457. In Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 328 (1877), it was rec-
ognized as the "settled law of this country" that the lands
under this nation's navigable freshwater lakes and rivers were
within the public trust given to the new states under the
1990]
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equal footing doctrine. The Phillips Petroleum Court emphat-
ically stated:
This Court's decisions in The Genesee Chief and Barney
v. Keokuk extended admiralty jurisdiction and public
trust doctrine to navigable fresh-waters and the lands be-
neath them. But we do not read those cases as simultane-
ously withdrawing from public trust coverage those lands
which had been consistently recognized in this Court's
cases as being within that doctrine's scope; all lands be-
neath waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide.
Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 797 (emphasis in original).
Ownership of tidal property was thus vested in the states
as they joined the Union and simultaneously, expressed in the
public trust doctrine. Ownership of fresh-water navigable wa-
ters and the lands beneath them was similarly vested in the
States. The public trust doctrine encompasses these waters
and submerged lands, too. Ownership of all lands influenced
by the tides and all lands underlying navigable waters was
vested in the states because these lands are subject to the
public trust. The states hold these trust lands in their sover-
eign capacity for the benefit and use of all citizens.
The case before the bar involves marshes and wetlands
which are non:-tidal and have never been navigable. (R.2). Al-
though Phillips Petroleum involved non-navigable submerged
lands subject to tidal influence, the implications of the public
trust doctrine on non-navigable, non-tidal waters and sub-
merged lands can be gleaned from this case. If the waters and
submerged lands are not subject to the ebb and flow of the
tides, the test to delineate public trust lands must therefore
be traditional navigability in fact at the time of statehood.
The marshes and wetlands of the Northwood Refuge were not
navigable at that time, nor are they navigable today. There-
fore, they fall beyond the scope of the public trust doctrine.
See Huffman, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: A Hid-
den Victory for Private Property?, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10051
(Feb. 1989).
The court should not construe the terms "trustee" and
"trusteeship" as used in CERCLA section 107(f) to invoke the
[21]
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public trust doctrine. Since Congress intended that the trus-
tee's decision of whether to perform a natural resource dam-
age assessment and then to pursue an enforcement action is
discretionary, it could not have meant for these words to do
so. The public trust doctrine would require a mandatory af-
firmative obligation on the part of the trustee which is con-
trary to congressional intent. Such invocation in this case
would also require an unwarranted expansion of the scope of
the doctrine and run contrary to a significant body of prece-
dent established by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the public
trust doctrine is clearly an inappropriate means for compel-
ling the Department of the Interior to perform a natural re-
source damage assessment and to recover damages from
Multi-Chem.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANT-
ING MULTI-CHEM'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CITY OF NORTHWOOD'S CERCLA ACTION BE-
CAUSE THE CITY IS CLEARLY PROHIBITED
FROM BRINGING SUCH AN ACTION BY THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF THE
STATUTE.
Appellant maintains that when the federal government in
the exercise of its discretionary power, elects not to perform a
damage assessment of, or recover damages for, a natural re-
source under CERCLA section 107(f)(1), that Appellant may
bring such an action. Appellant maintains that according to
section 101(27) it is a "State." Under CERCLA, any party
causing an injury to a natural resource within a state may be
held liable to that state under section 108(f)(1). For this to be
true, Appellant must not only be considered a "State" under
the statute, a proposition which Appellee will hereunder dis-
prove, but Appellant must also be determined to qualify as an
"authorized representative of a State" under sections
107(f)(1) and 107(f)(2)(B). Appellee will show why such an in-
terpretation of sections 101(27) and 107(f)(2)(B) is inconsis-
tent with the plain language and the overall purpose of the
statute.
[22]
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A. The City of Northwood Is Not a State as Defined by
Section 101(27) of CERCLA and Therefore, a Person
Accused of Damaging a Natural Resource Is Not Li-
able to It Under Section 107(f)(1).
The plain language of the statute clearly excludes a polit-
ical subdivision of a state from bringing an action as a state.
Section 101(27) provides, in pertinent part, that the term
"state" includes "the several states of the United States, the
District of Columbia, . . . and any other territory or posses-
sion over which the United States has jurisdiction." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(27). Under section 101(21), the "term person means [a]
. . .municipality, [or] a political subdivision of a State ...."
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). "When we find the terms of a statute
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete." Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981). It is clear that for the pur-
poses of the statute that a municipality is a person and not a
"State."
Two recent district court cases approaching this issue
held that a municipality was a "State" under CERCLA
101(27): Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F.
Supp. 633 (D.C.N.J. 1985); City of New York v. Exxon Corp.,
697 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (cases involving the defini-
tion of state under CERCLA § 101(27)). Both courts proposed
that, by using the word "includes," as opposed to using the
word "means," in section 101(27), Congress intended that the
definition encompassed other entities not specifically enumer-
ated. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 684. While it is possible
that the definition was meant to be non-exclusive, it does not
necessarily follow that Congress intended it to include munici-
palities. This is further demonstrated by express provisions
for municipalities in other provisions under CERCLA, includ-
ing, for example, sections 101(21), 104(d), and 123. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(21), 9604(d), 9623.
A more valid interpretation of "State" is that its defini-
tion includes other territories or possessions over which the
United States has jurisdiction, but which were not specifically
enumerated in section 101(27). Section 107(f)(2)(B) further
supports this understanding of section 101(27). It reads "[t]he
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Governor of each State shall designate State officials ...."
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B). This would indicate that a munici-
pality was not a "State" for the purposes of the statute be-
cause it provides that a governor, and not a mayor or board of
aldermen, shall designate "State" officials. This provision is
clearly intended to include those political entities subject only
to the federal government, and not those that are political
subdivisions of a sovereign entity, which are subject to an ad-
ditional layer of governmental authority. Congress used the
word "means" in section 101(21) because there was no consis-
tent pattern among the entities included as persons, as there
is among the included entities in section 101(27), and there-
fore Congress felt it had to limit the class.
The reasoning used by the Drew Chemical court in ex-
panding the definition of "State" to include municipalities
was that such a definition "was consistent with the remedial
intent of the Act." Drew Chemical, 621 F. Supp. at 666. In
Drew Chemical, the town sought to recover damages for inju-
ries to a natural resource under CERCLA section
107(a)(4)(C). Defendants challenged the suit on the grounds
that the town was not a "State" for purposes of recovery
under section 107(a)(4)(C). Id. The court opined that because
section 107 provided liability for natural resources related to
either federal, state, or local government, it would be "anoma-
lous" to allow a state to bring an action for damage to natural
resources owned by the state and not allow a city to do so for
a natural resource it owns. Id. Appellee posits that a more
reasonable interpretation of the Act is that the inclusion of
natural resources owned by municipalities in section 101(16)
was intended not to allow a city to bring an action for dam-
ages to its natural resources, but rather so a state could bring
such an action on behalf of a municipality within its borders.
This would mean that a valuable natural resource would not
be excluded from protection under the statute merely because
it was owned by local government. The municipality could re-
quest that the designated state official, serving as natural re-
source trustee for the state, bring an action, even though the
natural resource in question was not owned by the state.
The Drew Chemical court also considered that under nu-
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merous other statutes, a municipality has been treated as a
state. None of the statutes mentioned by the Drew Chemical
court are environmental statutes. Drew Chemical, 621 F.
Supp. at 667. In addition, there are statutes where such a defi-
nition has been construed to not include municipalities. Ohio
Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986)
(case involving an interpretation of OSHA's definition of
"State," 29 U.S.C. § 652 (1983), which is identical to that of
CERCLA's, and where the statute had made express provi-
sions for political subdivisions of states elsewhere in the stat-
ute). Because none of the statutes listed by the court in Drew
Chemical are environmental statutes, and because other stat-
utes containing similar language have been construed differ-
ently than those listed by the Drew Chemical court, this line
of reasoning is at best inconclusive. Furthermore, where a
clear understanding of the statute can be derived without go-
ing outside of its plain language and overall purpose, such
comparisons are of little value.
Appellee finds support for its position in City of Phila-
delphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 1484 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (case involving an attempt by a municipality to bring an
action as a "State" under CERCLA). The court in Stepan
Chemical found that the language of section 101(27) was un-
ambiguous and that there was no support in the legislative
history of the Act for the proposition that Congress intended
a municipality to be considered a "State" under CERCLA. Id.
at 1489. The court concluded that where "there is no clearly
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, [the court] must
regard the language used as conclusive." Id.
Under CERCLA section 107(f)(1), a party who has dam-
aged a natural resource is liable to the United States Govern-
ment or a "State." There is no basis for giving the statute's
definition of "State" so broad an interpretation as to include
municipalities in either the plain language of the statute, or
the legislative history of the Act. Therefore, Appellant lacks
the standing to bring an action under section 107(f)(1), and
the holding of the district court should be affirmed.
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B. The City of Northwood Is Not an Authorized Repre-
sentative of the State and Consequently May Not
Bring an Action Under Section 107(f)(1).
No evidence can be derived from the record, even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the Appellant, to sup-
port the proposition that the Appellant is an "authorized rep-
resentative of a State." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Section
107(f)(1) states that, where there has been damage to a natu-
ral resource "[t]he President or the authorized representative
of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of
such natural resources to recover for such damages." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(f)(1). Section 107(f)(2)(B) provides that such trustees
are to be designated by the governor of each "State." 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(B). In Drew Chemical the court found evi-
dence that supported a finding that the State of New Jersey
had authorized the Town of Boonton to bring an action under
section 107(f)(1). Drew Chemical, 621 F. Supp. at 667. Costs
had been incurred by the town while acting under the direc-
tion of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion. Id. at 668. In Exxon Corp., there was also evidence in
the record to support a contention that the State of Pennsyl-
vania authorized the action by the city. Exxon Corp., 697 F.
Supp. at 686. Appellant has requested that the Governor of
New Union designate the City of Northwood as a trustee for
the wildlife refuge. The Governor has declined to do so. Those
individuals that have been named by the Governor to serve as
trustees have chosen not to join the City of Northwood in
bringing this action. Therefore, Appellant is not an authorized
representative of a state and may not bring an action under
section 107(f)(1).
The court in Drew Chemical held that a municipality
could proceed under section 107(f)(1) if the statute's defini-
tion of state was interpreted expansively, or alternatively, if a
municipality was an authorized representative of the state.
Drew Chemical, 621 F. Supp. at 667. Appellee disagrees with
this interpretation of section 107(f)(1). These two condi-
tions-qualifying as a "State" under section 101(27), and as
an "authorized representative of a State" under 107(f)(1)-are
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presented in a conjunctive fashion. Where there is liability to
a state, an authorized representative of the state, designated
by the governor of the state, shall act as trustee and bring
such action as the circumstances require. 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(1). Therefore, Appellant may be allowed to proceed
only if it is a state and, as such, has the power to designate
itself as trustee for the wildlife refuge. This is directly con-
trary to the language of section 107(f)(2)(B), which provides
that such trustees shall be appointed by the Governor. Appel-
lant is neither a "State" nor an "authorized representative of
a State" and therefore, the District Court of New Union's de-
cision to grant Appellee's motion to dismiss should be
affirmed.
C. Allowing Municipalities to Bring Actions Under
Section 107 Would Defeat the Overall Purpose of
CERCLA.
Appellant argues that precluding a municipality from act-
ing as a trustee under section 107(f)(1) would contravene the
overall purpose of the statute. CERCLA was drafted to pro-
tect and preserve the public health and the environment. Ex-
xon Corp., 697 F. Supp. at 685. However, Congress was aware
that there are limited resources available for pursuing these
ends, both in terms of finances and trained personnel. If mu-
nicipalities were allowed to bring actions under section
107(f)(1), the federal courts might be subject to a flood of liti-
gation. Even if the courts were able to handle the additional
litigation, it is doubtful that there currently exists either
enough trained expert personnel to successfully carry out the
clean-up process, or more importantly, the money to pay for
it. This is why the statute provides the states with the discre-
tion to decide when and where to bring such actions. The
state is allowed to consider what actions should be given
priority.
CERCLA is built upon a system of prioritization, as evi-
denced by the National Priorities List and the Hazard Rank-
ing System. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c), 9605(g)(2), 9618. Section
105(a)(8)(B) illustrates an additional example of how CER-
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CLA is built around a system of prioritization by both federal
and state governments. It provides that each "State" shall
submit to the federal government a list of priorities for reme-
dial actions. This list should be developed with respect to the
criteria set forth in section 105(a)(8)(A). Those criteria in-
clude relative risk or danger to the public health or welfare
and the environment. This process obviously requires that a
state exercise its discretion in selecting a top priority, and rat-
ing other targets of action under CERCLA in order of poten-
tial risk to the public health and welfare.
In the instant action, the State of New Union has not
chosen to pursue the matter. Whether the State made its de-
cision because its resources were committed to other CER-
CLA actions or because it did not perceive the threat to the
wildlife refuge to be significant is immaterial. What is mate-
rial is that under the statute, a "State" has the discretion to
make such a determination and that discretionary power is
consistent with the overall purpose of CERCLA. Therefore, a
finding that a municipality may not proceed under section
107(f)(1) would be consistent with, and further the overall
purpose of the statute.
D. There Can Be Only One Definition of State Under
the Statute and the Only One that Can Be Ration-
ally Applied to All Sections of the Statute Is the
Narrow One that Arises from the Plain Language of
Section 101 (27).
To find that a municipality is a "State" for the purposes
of section 107 would mean that it would also have to be con-
sidered a state under other sections of CERCLA. Otherwise,
there would have to be two different meanings given to the
word "State" in the same statute. Section 105(a)(8)(B) of
CERCLA sets a goal of including "the top priority among
known response targets" from each "State" in a list of the top
one hundred targets nationally. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B). It
would be incongruous to propose that Congress intended for
every city and town in the United States and its territories to
submit a highest priority target to the President under section
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105(a)(8)(B). This section clearly demonstrates the inapplica-
bility of an overly expansive definition of "State" under CER-
CLA. To include the number one priority site from every city
and town in a list of one hundred sites would obviously be
impossible. Such a list would have to include thousands, if not
hundreds of thousands, of such sites.
When one takes the expansive definition of "State" pos-
ited by Appellant and applies it to other equally important
sections of the statute it is clear that such a definition was not
intended by Congress. Because whatever definition chosen
must be applied consistently throughout the statute, the only
possible definition of "State" under CERCLA is the narrow
one that arises from the plain language of section 101(27).
Therefore, Appellant is not a "State" as defined by section
101(27), and the decision of the District Court for the District
of New Union granting Appellee's motion to dismiss should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of New Union should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorney for
Appellee Multi-Chemical Co.
Dated: November 28, 1989
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